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Abstract
In the Sachar Committee Report, a report from 2006 about the socio-economic status of Muslims
in India, it was stated that a number of constituencies (electoral districts) reserved for Scheduled
Castes (SCs) have a high proportion of Muslims and a low proportion of SCs, while there are
many general (unreserved) constituencies with fewer Muslims and more SCs. Some have
interpreted this as an allegation that the Delimitation Commission in the 1970s willfully assigned
constituencies reserved for SCs to areas with a high Muslim population. Since this Delimitation
was in force for more than 30 years (1974-2007), this could have seriously undermined the
representation of Muslims in India. In this paper I use archival evidence from the Election
Commission records as well as unique statistical data of the Muslim population across Indian
constituencies in the 1970s to show that there is no evidence that such a systematic
discrimination took place. Looking at data from 14 Indian states, I show that the Muslim
population is on average lower in reserved constituencies than in general ones. This is mainly due
to the fact that reserved seats by construction have a high concentration of SCs, and therefore a
lower concentration of other groups. On comparing reserved and general constituencies with
similar proportions of SCs, I find that there is no statistically significant difference in the
proportion of Muslims in reserved and general areas. These results do not suggest that Muslims
have been adequately represented in Indian politics, but simply that it is unfounded allegation
that Muslims have been over-represented in reserved constituencies.
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Introduction
In the Sachar Committee Report, a report from 2006 about the socio-economic status of
Muslims in India, it was stated that a number of constituencies (electoral districts) reserved for
Scheduled Castes (SCs) have a high proportion of Muslims and a low proportion of SCs, while
there are many general (unreserved) constituencies with fewer Muslims and more SCs.2 The
veracity of this claim was supported with examples of the percentages of Muslims and SCs in
reserved constituencies in UP, Bihar and West Bengal: “The data shows that constituencies which
have been declared reserved for SCs by the Delimitation Commission in these three states are by
and large those constituencies where Muslims live in greater numbers often more than 50 per cent
as well as their proportion in the population is higher than that of SCs […] Arguably, this can be
seen as discriminatory and certainly reduces the opportunities that Muslims have to get elected to
democratic institutions” (Sachar 2006, footnote 7 p. 25). Some interpreted this evidence as an
unfortunate side-effect of the reservation system – arguing that the Delimitation Commission
could not avoid picking areas with a large number of Muslims because Muslims and SCs tend to
live in the same areas – while others perceived it as an allegation that the Delimitation
Commission had willfully undermined the representation of Muslims in India. The previous
delimitation at the time of writing this report was the 1976 Delimitation. Since this Delimitation
was in force for more than 30 years (1974 – 2007),3 a systematic bias against the Muslim
community in this delimitation would have been a serious act of discrimination against the
Muslim community in India. In this paper I show that the evidence provided in the Sachar report
2On 9 March 2005, the Prime Minister’s Office issued a notification for the constitution of a
High Level Committee for the preparation of a report on the social, economic and educational
status of the Muslim community of India. The committee was chaired by Justice Rajindar Sachar
and submitted their report in 2006. The full report and related documents are available online at
[URL] http://minorityaffairs.gov.in/sachar, accessed May 30 2013.
3The official year of the delimitation report was 1976, but some states (including UP and Orissa)
started using the new delimitation already in 1974.
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was wrong and misleading and that Muslims were not over-represented in the state assembly
constituencies that were reserved for SCs between 1974 to 2007. 
The evidence is presented in three sections. The next section provides an overview of the
political representation of Muslims in India, of the claims in the Sachar Committee Report, and
of the problems with the evidence provided in the report. Using archival evidence from the
Election Commission records, I then go through how the delimitation process in the 1970s took
place. The detailed internal records of the work of the Delimitation Committee show that the
process of delimiting constituencies was done systematically on the basis of census data and
maps. There is no evidence in the records of the selection of reserved seats being influenced by
the demographic distribution of religious communities. However, such biases could have crept in
without leaving traces in historical records. In the last section I therefore present estimates of the
1971 Muslim population in 3,199 constituencies in 14 Indian states, and show that at the time of
the delimitation the Muslim population was on average lower in reserved constituencies than in
general ones, that Muslims only out-number SCs in a few reserved constituencies (while they
out-number them in many more general ones), and that the examples provided in the Sachar
Committee report were extreme cases that are not representative of the norm. The slight under-
representation of Muslims (and other groups) in reserved constituencies is natural, since SC
constituencies by construction have a high concentration of SCs. When matching reserved
constituencies to comparable general constituencies, there is no difference in the percentage of
Muslims in the population across these matched pairs.
These results show that it is an unfounded allegation that Muslims have been over-
represented in reserved constituencies. This does not suggest, however, that Muslims have been
adequately represented in Indian politics. Looking at the percentages of SCs and Muslims across
the constituencies in this dataset it is apparent that there are large groups of Muslims in some
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reserved constituencies. The way the reservation system for SCs is designed there will always be
large non-SC communities in these constituencies. In the case of Muslims it might seem
particularly unfair to be part of such a large minority, since Muslims have been – and remain –
politically under-represented in India. The fact that SCs have reservations, while Muslims have
no such safeguards, means that there are fewer open seats from which Muslims (and other
groups) can compete.  The political question remains whether the under-representation of
Muslims should be fought by granting political reservations, requiring that political parties
should promote more minority candidates, changing the electoral system to accommodate
minority representation, or by working harder to reduce the social biases that prevent candidates
from minority communities from being electorally competitive in open seats.
Muslim representation in India
The concern about the under-represented of Muslims in Indian politics is not a new issue. In
October 1906, after discussions had started about allowing Indians to elect representatives to the
legislative councils across the country, a delegation of Muslims visited Lord Minto, the Viceroy
of India, in his summer residence in Shimla to demand political safeguards. In an address read by
Sir Aga Khan III, they argued that Muslims would remain a minority in a plurality electoral
system, and that Muslims must be ensured communal representation. In his response to the
address, Minto stated that: “the Mahommedan community may rest assured that their political
rights and interests as a community will be safeguarded by any administrative re-organization
with which I am concerned” (quoted in Minto 1934, p. 47). 
Minto kept his promise. In the Indian Council Act of 1909 several communities, including
Muslims, landholders and different commercial interests, were ensured the right to elect
community representatives to the Legislative Councils in British India (Ilbert 1910, pp. 432-35).
4
Ten years later, the Montagu-Chelmsford report (1918, p. 149) strongly discouraged a
continuation of the communal representation, but conceded that it would be politically difficult to
remove the provisions that were in place: 
“The Muhammedans regard these as settled facts, and any attempt to go back on them
will rouse a storm of bitter protest and put a severe strain on the loyalty of a
community which has behaved with conspicuous loyalty during a period of very great
difficulty […] How can we say to them that we regard the decision of 1909 as
mistaken, that its retention is incompatible with progress towards responsible
government, that its reversal will eventually be to their benefit; and that for these
reasons we have decided to go back on it?” 
As a result, political reservations for Muslims, and other groups, became a part of the
Government of India Acts of 1909, 1919, 1935 and the first draft of the Indian constitution.
However, seeing the violent effects of communal conflict at the time of Partition made many of
the representatives in India's Constituent Assembly change their minds. In spring 1949, the
Advisory Committee on Minorities and Fundamental Rights passed a resolution to abolish
reservations for religious minorities. Sardar Patel, the chairman of the Committee, explained in a
letter to the President of the Constituent Assembly that the resolution was motivated conditions in
the country having “vastly changed since August 1947” and that “it was no longer appropriate in
the context of free India and of present conditions that there should be reservation of seats for
Muslims, Christians, Sikhs or any other religious community” (CAD 1950/1999, vol. 3, pp. 311-
12). The resolution was supported by several of the Muslim representatives in the Constituent
Assembly. For example, Begam Aizaz Rasul stated that “reservation is a self-destructive weapon
which separates the minorities from the majority for all time” (CAD, 1950/1999, vol. 3, p. 300).
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The Assembly consequently removed the constitutional provisions for reservations for religious
communities, and only kept them for a limited time period for SCs and Scheduled Tribes (STs). 4
Over time, however, it has become clear that Muslims in India have remained politically
under-represented and lagged behind other group in socio-economic terms. According to the
Indian census of 2001, Muslims constitute 13.4% of the Indian population, but their
representation in political positions has consistently been lower than that. In an overview of
Muslim representatives in the Indian national parliament from 1952–2004, Ansari (2006, p. 64)
shows that Muslims only held about 4% of the seats after the 1952 election, that their
representation gradually increased to about 9% in the 1980 elections and then declined to 5-7% in
the elections between the mid-1980s and 2004. Ansari (2006) concludes that Muslims have been
consistently under-represented and that parties’ unwillingness to nominate Muslim candidates is
one of the main reasons for this under-representation.5
Going through data from the 2009 national elections, Jaffrelot et al. (2009) report that 5.5%
of the Members of Parliament were Muslims, although more than 10% of the contesting
candidates were Muslims. The low success rate of these candidates could mean that political
parties fielded Muslims in constituencies were they were not expecting to win the election, or that
there was a bias against Muslim candidates among the voters. It could also be that these
candidates were less competitive than other candidates, since 393 out of the 832 Muslim
candidates (47%) ran as independents and therefore did not have the electoral support of one the
major party networks. 
4The original time limit was 10 years, but these provisions have been extended every 10 years
since the constitution came into force and are still in place. 
5He suggested that the representation of Muslims could be increased by making it compulsory
for parties to nominate more candidates from religious minorities, by including Dalit Muslims in
the lists of SCs, or by dereserving SC/ST constituencies with a high population share of Muslims
(Ansari 2006, pp. 400–401).
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In an extensive study of the caste-community profile of elected representatives in India,
Jaffrelot and Kumar (2009) provide state-wise evidence of the changing nature of members of the
legislative assemblies across 16 Indian states. They show that while there has been an increase in
the representation of several marginalized groups, the representation of Muslims has remained
fairly stable over time. In Uttar Pradesh (UP), where Muslim constituted about 18.5% of the
population according to the 2001 census, they have held between 5.5% and 12% of political
positions between 1952 and 2002.  In West Bengal, with a large Muslim minority (25% in 2001),
Muslims have held 9.7-14.3% of the positions in the legislative assemblies.  
In ongoing work, Bhalotra et al. (2012) use legislator names to identify Muslim members of
state legislative assemblies in India between 1980 and 2007. They find that across India the share
of Muslim state legislators has remained between 7% and 8.5% over these decades. Comparing
the presence of Muslims in assemblies to their share of the population in each state shows that
they are under-represented in every state except the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and
Kashmir. There does not appear to be any specific pattern in the fraction of Muslim candidates
compared to Muslim legislators. In some states, the fraction of Muslim legislators is slightly
smaller than the fraction of Muslim candidates (e.g. West Bengal, Kerala), but the reverse holds
true in other states (e.g. Gujarat, Bihar). There is, however, a clear difference in party affiliation
between Muslim and non-Muslim legislators: only 1% of Muslim legislators belong to the BJP,
compared to 14% of non-Muslim legislators that come from other parties.6
The Sachar Committee Report
In recent elections, the demand for reservations for Muslims in educational institutions,
governmental jobs and in politics has been used as a campaign strategy by several political
6In ongoing work, Raphael Susewind (2013, forthcoming) has also developed name recognition
software that is able to identify the religious community of MLAs. This software relies both on
name recognition from name databases and recognition of common combinations of letters, and
will therefore probably be able to categorize names better than existing softwares.
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leaders. Responding to the increasingly politicized issue of the status of Muslims in India, the
Prime Minister’s office issued a notification in March 2005 of the creation of a High Level
Committee which was to prepare a report on the social, economic and educational status of
Muslims in India. This committee, which was chaired by Justice Rajindar Sachar, submitted their
report in 2006. 
The Sachar report included chapters about demographics, education, employment, bank
credit, access to infrastructure, poverty, health and other socio-economic issues. The political
representation of Muslims was not part of the Terms of Reference of the report, and in the main
text of the report only a few paragraphs are about the political representation of Muslims. Yet, the
short foreword of the report includes the following two paragraphs (Sachar, 2006, p. xiii):
“Another issue emphasized before the Committee was that a number of
Parliamentary and Assembly constituencies with substantial Muslim voter population
are reserved for SCs while the SC population was not high there. Contrarily,
constituencies with comparatively lesser Muslim voter population remain unreserved
even though they have sizable SC population. It was suggested to the Committee that it
would be more equitable to reserve those constituencies where voter population of SCs
is high rather than those where it is low and, instead, Muslim presence is high. (See
Chapter-2)
This matter is in the purview of Delimitation Commission. The Committee hopes
that it would receive the attention of the Government immediately because the
Delimitation Commission is at present engaged in this exercise and evidently any
suggestion or any exercise to be done by it has to be undertaken during the current
term of the present Delimitation Commission.” 
8
The wording of these paragraphs suggests that Muslims have been systematically over-
represented in reserved constituencies. Because of its prominent position in the foreword of the
report this claim received considerable attention, and has since then been repeated in political
debates, newspapers, internet articles and academic papers.7 Some of those commenting on the
report have denounced the evidence in the report and called it a political gimmick meant to set
the stage for a political demand for reservations for Muslims, but a lack of easily available data
has made it hard to provide consistent counter-evidence.8 In this paper I try to provide such data
by explaining in some detail the process by which seats were reserved for SCs by the
Delimitation Commission in the 1970s and by presenting estimates of the percentage of Muslims
across general and reserved constituencies. First, however, I will address some of the problems
with the evidence of the representation of Muslims that was presented in the Sachar Committee
Report.
The conclusion in the Sachar Committe report about Muslims being over-represented in
reserved constituencies was based on weak evidence. In Chapter 2 of the report it is noted that in
talking to Muslims across Indian states the “[a]ttention of the Committee was drawn to the issue
of Muslim concentration assembly constituencies being declared as 'reserved' constituencies
7The claim has been discussed by, among others, Basant (2007), Kalam (2007), Alam (2008),
Ahmed (2008) and Yadav (2008). There are also many newspaper articles and blog posts about
the evidence presented in the report. For example, on 19 April 2011 Mumtaz Alam Falahi
reproduces the tables from the Sachar committee in a post at twoCircles.net and commented that
“It’s like killing of two birds with one stone. Constitutional requirements for one community is
fulfilled at the cost of the other. Seats are reserved for Scheduled Castes in legislative bodies in
the country - a constitutional obligation - but it is done in effect by diminishing the Muslims
representation in the very legislatures.” This article was then posted on other blogs, including the
blog of Congress politician Mohd. Khaleequr Rahman.
8For example, the keynote speaker in a seminar about the report in Ahmedabad, Dr Rakesh Sinha
from the Department of Political Science at the University of Delhi, denounced the report: “There
was no transparency in the working of the committee. It has twisted facts and figures. It has even
suggested delimitation of constituencies so that the Muslim population in different places can
come under one constituency. This is a clear case of overreach and a precursor to the demand for
religion-based reservations” (cited in an article posted on [URL] www.expressIndia.com April 27
2008, accessed May 30 2013).
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where only SC candidates can contest elections. By this move, it was argued that Muslims are
being systematically denied political participation” (Sachar 2006, p. 25). As mentioned in the
introduction, is was then stated that efforts were made to ascertain this allegation, and that it had
been found to be true on the basis of data from UP, Bihar and West Bengal (Sachar 2006, p. 25,
footnote 7):
“The data shows that constituencies which have been declared reserved for SCs by the
Delimitation Commission in these three states are by and large those constituencies
where Muslims live in greater numbers often more than 50 per cent as well as their
proportion in the population is higher than that of SCs. On the other hand, there are
quite a large number of other constituencies within the respective states, where the
share of SCs is large, often closer to or even more than one half but these are declared
as ‘un-reserved’. Arguably, this can be seen as discriminatory and certainly reduces the
opportunities that Muslims have to get elected to democratic institutions.” 
The data that was collated by the Committee was appended to the report, and the data provided
for UP has been reproduced in Figure 1. Looking at the data in Figure 1, the conclusion drawn by
the Committee seems fair. The numbers show areas in UP that are said to be reserved and which
have a higher population of Muslims than SCs, and clearly show that other general areas have a
high number of SCs and a low number of Muslims. This evidence has been criticized for being
weak because there are few cases and that these cases may not be representative. This is an
important criticism, since the data that it presented includes only 8 reserved and 9 general areas
in UP (and 9 reserved and general areas from Bihar and 10 reserved and general areas from West
Bengal). In addition, however, the numbers are both wrong and misleading. 
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Figure 1: Evidence from UP of Muslims being over-represented in reserved constituencies 
(reproduced from Sachar, 2006, p. 269).
The first problem is that the data presented is for administrative blocks, not for constituencies.
For example, the first row of data is for Hapur tahsil, not Hapur constituency. Hapur tahsil is an
administrative block that was split between three constituencies in the 1976 delimitation (and in
the 2008 delimitation). In the 1976 delimitation, Hapur Tahsil was split between constituency
number 391 Hapur (reserved for SC), 392 Garhmukteshwar (general) and 398 Kharkhauda
(general).9 In other words, the numbers in the first row of the table represent data for three
assembly constituencies, of which only one is reserved. This problem applies not only to Hapur,
but to the other cases that are presented too, since there is hardly ever a perfect overlap between
political constituencies and administrative blocks in India.
9Which after Uttaranchal became an independent state became constituencies 375, 376, 382.
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The second problem with the data is that it is from the 2001 census of India, while the
Delimitation Commission, which drew these boundaries and selected these seats, worked with
data from the 1971 census of India. Since there have been considerable changes in the total
population, the SC population, and the religious composition in India between 1971 and 2001,
the data is potentially very different from the data that was originally used to create these
constituencies. 
Finally, and most importantly, the cases that are shown are extreme cases that do not provide
an accurate impression of the SC population or Muslim population in reserved and general
constituencies in the three states. As will be shown in Figure 2, there are places in UP, Bihar,
West Bengal and other states that are reserved for SCs although they have a low SC population
and a high Muslim population, but this is not the norm. In the next section I will describe how the
selection of reserved seats took place in the 1970s and show that there is no evidence of bias
against the Muslim community in the work of the Delimitation Commission. 
The delimitation process
The boundaries of state assembly constituencies and parliamentary constituencies in India are
determined by the Delimitation Commission, which is set down by the Government of India
under the provisions of the Delimitation Commission Acts. When the constitution of India was
drafted, the intention was that a new Delimitation would be conducted after every decennial
census, in order for all constituencies to retain approximately the same population size.
Consequently, a Delimitation Commission was formed, and new constituency boundaries were
drawn out, in 1952, 1963 and 1972. However, in the 1970s it was decided to ‘freeze’ all political
boundaries until 2001, as increasing the political representation of areas with a higher birthrate
was seen as a perverse incentive to the implementation of family planning programs.10 The result
10The decision was implemented in the 42nd Amendment to the Indian Constitution in 1976.
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was that the boundaries of most constituencies in India, and therefore also the location of the
constituencies reserved for SCs, remained the same between 1974 and 2007.
The work of the Delimitation Commission of the 1970s was meticulously recorded and kept
in the archives of the Election Commission of India, and I studied the work of the Commission
by going through these records.11 The first draft of new constituencies was completed in the
Election Commission premises in New Delhi. The Commission received district-wise booklets
from the Census of India office, with information about the overall population, SC population
and ST population in each village in India, according to the 1971 census. A group of civil
servants consulted these booklets, as well as maps of the districts, and drew out suggested new
constituencies. Their goal when delimiting the boundaries of each constituency was to ensure
geographically coherent areas with a similarly sized electorate. State assembly constituencies
were to fit within the boundaries of each district, while Lok Sabha were constructed from several
State Assembly constituencies, and could therefore cross district boundaries. The documents they
worked with did not contain information about the religious composition of villages or districts.
Once all the constituency boundaries had been drawn out, the next step was to select seats to
be reserved. According to the Delimitation Act of 1972 (GOI, 1972), there were two selection
criteria: (1) that the proportion of SCs should be high in selected constituencies and (2) that the
reserved constituencies should be geographically spread out within the state. In practice this
meant that states, and then districts, were ‘assigned’ reserved seats on the basis of the proportion
of SCs in their population. For example, since 13.3 % of the population in Andhra Pradesh was
SC, and since the state assembly was supposed to have 294 political seats, 13.3% of those 294
seats were to be reserved. In the same way, if a district had 13 % SCs and 6 political seats, then
11This information in this section is based on my archival work in the record room of the
Election Commission in February 2011. I am grateful to the Director of Statistics Yashvir Singh
for granting me access to these records. Soon after I consulted the records they were transferred
to the National Archive in New Delhi, where they are now publicly available.
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6*0.13=0.78≈1 reserved seat was assigned to that district. If a district was eligible for one
reserved seat, the constituency with the highest proportion of SCs within the district was to be
assigned to be reserved. If a district was eligible for more than one seat, the two constituencies
with the highest proportion of SCs, which were not bordering each other and preferably not in the
same block or subdivision, were supposed to be chosen to be reserved. Similarly, reservations
were given to the Lok Sabha seats with the highest proportion SCs within each state that were not
bordering each other and preferably not in the same Division of the state. At this stage of the
delimitation it therefore seems unlikely that the Delimitation Commission could have
discriminated against religious minorities in their work.
At the next step of the delimitation process, however, there was some room for political
maneuvering. Each state was asked to select 5 Members of Parliament and 5 Members of the
Legislative Assembly to serve as associate members of the Commission. These associated
members were supposed to go through the suggested constituencies and provide local knowledge
about geography and infrastructure that might make the constituencies unpractical. The
Delimitation Commission also travelled to each of the states and had open public meetings where
they heard the opinions of people about how the borders should be redrawn. In addition, the
Commission received many letters from people trying to influence the delimitation process. Their
records include minutes from these meetings and copies of these letters, and show how they
treated the various suggestions. 
Without doubt the most common concern that was raised was about moving the location of
reserved seats. In most of these cases the Delimitation Commission made it clear that they would
not follow such suggestions. For example, in the resume (summary) of the public sittings and
meetings with associate members in various cities in Madhya Pradesh in 1974 it was written that
“[s]everal proposals were made for revising the extent of the seven constituencies in the district
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with the main object of shifting the SC seat […] These proposals were also made in the meeting
with the Associate Members but were not accepted by the Commission. We may not make any
change in the extent of the constituencies.” The extent to which the Delimitation Commission
ignored suggestions they perceived as politically motivated can be gaged from a letter of March
29, 1975 from Bhogendra Jha, associate member from Bihar, who wrote: “We beg of you to
express our shock and surprise at the proposals having almost totally hushed aside duly signed
and argued proposals by three-fourths of the associate members. Even criterias of geographical
compactness, administrative boundaries, communication facilities, etc. have not been given the
least consideration in several cases.”
There are some exceptions to the Delimitation Commission assigning the constituencies with
the highest proportion of SCs to be reserved for SCs. In some cases the constituency with the
highest proportion of SCs also had the highest proportion of STs and was therefore reserved for
STs. In some other cases the Commission chose to pick the constituency with the second highest
proportion SCs to be reserved because it was argued that the area with the highest proportion of
SCs had already been reserved for the past 20 years, and that this led to people in the area losing
interest in politics. Other than that, the records suggest that the Commission was fairly faithful to
their task of selecting reserved seats on the basis of the concentration of the SCs in the population
and spreading the reserved seats out within the state. At no point in the internal documents of the
Delimitation Commission is there any mention of the proportion of Muslims or other religious
communities in delimiting constituencies or assigning reserved seats. 
The result of the step-wise selection of reserved seats effectively spread the constituencies
reserved for SCs across the country, but also meant that many constituencies with a high
percentage of SCs remained general. Looking at the 14 largest Indian states, the percentage of
SCs in the general constituencies that were created in the 1970s ranged from about 0.2 % to 51.7
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%, with an average percentage of 14 %. In the constituencies reserved for SC, the percentage of
SCs in the population ranged from 4% to 66.5% (in Bihar and West Bengal respectively), with an
average of about 25 %.12 
Muslims in Indian constituencies
Evidence presented in the previous section suggest that the Delimitation Commission did not take
the religious composition of areas into consideration when they drew constituency boundaries or
selected reserved seats. As was explained, however, such biases could have crept in through the
pressures and suggestions made by local politicians. To determine whether this actually
happened, we need to look at the actual numbers of Muslims in the constituencies that were
created in the 1970s. The best source for this information is the 1971 census of India, since this
was the data consulted by the Delimitation Commission, politicians and others at the time of the
drafting of the delimitation. 
There were two major challenges to working with the 1971 census data. First, the data were
not electronically available. Second, the geographical units of the census are different from
political constituencies. The first problem was solved by entering the data for the religious
composition for each block in the 15 largest Indian states.13 The second problem was solved by
creating estimates for the religious composition of constituencies based on this block level data.
Going through the 1976 Delimitation report, it is easy to identify which blocks overlapped with
which constituencies. One constituency typically consisted of about 1.5 blocks, and in such cases
the estimated constituency level values are the sum of the values for the whole block and half of
12The numbers for the percentage SCs in each constituency in the 1970s are from the internal
records of the Delimitation Commission.
13This work was done in collaboration with Dr Sanjeer Alam at the Center for the Study of
Developing Societies and with the excellent research assistantship of Jeevan Kumar.
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the values for the other block. I was able to do this for 14 states.14 Since the constituency level
estimates are population-weighted estimates they might not be perfectly accurate at the
constituency level, but assuming that the mistakes are uncorrelated with whether a constituency is
reserved or general, the group averages for the reserved and general constituencies should be
unbiased. 
The resulting dataset has estimates of the religious composition of each of the 3,199
constituencies in the 14 states at the time of the 1970s delimitation. On average across the
constituencies in these states, Muslims constituted 10.3% of the population. 
Summary statistics for the Muslim population across the constituencies in these states are
presented in Table 1. The first column (N) gives the number of state assembly constituencies
included in the dataset, the other columns show the minimum, maximum, median and average
percentage of Muslims in the constituencies in each state. As we can see from the table, the
percentage of Muslims is the highest in West Bengal (since Jammu and Kashmir is not included),
where the percentage of Muslims ranged from about 0.5% to almost 80%, with an average of
about 20.5%. A median value of about 14.3% means that half of the constituencies had less than
14.3% percentage of Muslims, but that a few constituencies with a very high percentage of
Muslims pulled up the average. Kerala had a similar pattern, while in other states the numbers of
Muslims across the constituencies were lower.
One of the concerns often raised about the representation of Muslims in India is that they are
in minority in almost all constituencies and therefore cannot easily get elected. The estimates
presented here confirm this concern, as they suggest that Muslims only formed the majority in of
the electorate in 52 constituencies in these 14 states between 1974 and 2007 (1.6% of the
14The states included in the data are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, UP
and West Bengal. Data for Orissa was excluded in this case because of issues in matching up
blocks and constituencies. The merging work was done in collaboration with Dr Rikhil Bhavnani
and has been described in further detail Jensenius (2013).
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constituencies). However, given that about 8% of Indian politicians from 1980 to 2000 were
Muslims, most Muslim candidates who have won elections must have done so with the support of
non-Muslim communities. 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the percentage of Muslims in state assembly constituencies in 14 
Indian states
N Min Max Median Mean
Andhra Pradesh 294 0.12 35.61 6.41 8.10
Bihar 324 1.04 72.44 10.98 13.46
Gujarat 181 1.37 31.30 7.18 8.36
Haryana 90 0.19 76.36 0.85 3.90
Himachal Pradesh 68 0.03 9.72 0.65 1.47
Karnataka 224 2.01 28.67 10.22 10.61
Kerala 140 1.35 70.23 14.24 19.50
Madhya Pradesh 320 0.24 25.79 2.83 4.35
Maharashtra 288 0.81 31.47 7.84 8.40
Punjab 117 0.02 15.18 0.34 0.81
Rajasthan 200 0.36 42.37 5.11 6.88
Tamil Nadu 234 0.82 25.56 4.13 5.11
Uttar Pradesh 425 0.05 59.74 13.06 15.49
West Bengal 294 0.46 79.88 14.29 20.47
More Muslims in reserved constituencies? 
The data presented in the previous section suggest that Muslims formed a majority of the
electorate in only 52 constituencies in the 14 states covered in the data. But are there more
Muslims than SCs in many reserved constituencies?  Figure 2 shows the percentages of Muslims
and SCs in the constituencies in the sample. The left plot shows the general constituencies in the
sample, while the right plot shows the constituencies reserved for SCs. 
The diagonal line splits the constituencies into areas where there are more SCs than
Muslims and constituencies where there are more Muslims than SCs. Since both groups are large
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minorities who are spread unevenly across India, there are cases of both reserved and general
constituencies with more Muslims and with more SCs. Overall there are 51 reserved
constituencies (out of the 480) where there are more Muslims than SCs, and there are 2 reserved
constituencies with a Muslim majority. It is therefore a clear exaggeration to claim that Muslims
are “often more than 50 per cent” as was stated in the Sachar Commission report (footnote 7 p.
25).
Figure 2: Percentage of Muslims and SCs in constituencies across 14 Indian states
The circles around some of the dots in the plots show the constituencies that roughly
correspond to the tahsils (blocks) from UP given as evidence in the Sachar committee report for
Muslims being over-represented in reserved constituencies. As we can see in the plot of general
constituencies, the areas given as examples are extreme cases that had a higher percentage of SCs
and a lower percentage of Muslims than most of the other constituencies. In the plot of reserved
constituencies, we can see that the examples in the report are extreme cases where the Muslim
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representation was unusually high compared to the SC population. As is quite apparent in these
plots, there are many constituencies across India where there are more Muslims than SCs, but
that is not the typical scenario in reserved constituencies, and it is not more common in reserved
constituencies than in general ones.
Finally, we can return to the question of whether there were more Muslims in reserved
constituencies than in non-reserved constituencies. If this was the case we should expect to see
that the percentage of Muslims was higher in reserved constituencies than in non-reserved
constituencies. The left plot of Figure 3 shows the distribution of the percentage of Muslims in
general constituencies and constituencies reserved for SCs. In general constituencies we can see
that the average value for Muslims was about 11%, while in constituencies reserved for SCs it
was about 10%. In other words, there were on average fewer Muslims in reserved constituencies
than in general constituencies, and these differences are statistically significant from 0 (p<0.01 in
a Welch two-sample t-test).15
This finding is not surprising given that constituencies reserved for SCs were selected
because they had a higher percentage of SCs than other constituencies. If there were more SCs in
these constituencies then by construction there were fewer others. It might therefore be more
interesting to look at the percentage of Muslims among the non-SCs in the population in these
constituencies. The right plot in Figure 3 shows the percentage of Muslims among the non-SCs
in general and reserved constituencies. In this case we see that Muslims constituted 12.7% of the
population in general constituencies and 13.3% in constituencies reserved for SCs. This
difference of 0.6 percentage points is not statistically significant.  
15In constituencies reserved for STs, the proportion Muslims is much lower than in both genera
constituencies and constituencies reserved for SCs. This is probably because ST seats are not
spread out geographically, but are assigned to areas with a very high proportion STs. This is not
really possible to do in the case of SCs, since SCs are much more spread out across the country
than STs.
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Figure 3: Percentage of Muslims in reserved and general constituencies across 14 Indian states
However, looking at this data at the aggregate level may conceal important state-wise
variation. Figure 4 shows the percentage of Muslims in reserved and general constituencies
across the 14 states in the sample. In the plot we can see the average percentages as well as the
range of percentages of Muslims (minimum to maximum) in reserved and general constituencies.
P-values from significance tests (Welch two-sample t-test) are reported on the right side of the
plot. Consistent with the cross-state findings, we see that the percentage of Muslims is
consistently lower in reserved constituencies than in general ones across all the states. For the
most part these differences are not statistically significantly different from each other, except for
Bihar and Rajasthan where there are statistically significantly fewer Muslims in reserved
constituencies than in general ones.
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Figure 4: Percentage of Muslims in reserved and general constituencies by state
Looking at the data in this way may still be biased, because there might be a correlation
between where Muslims and SCs happen to live. Perhaps there are generally fewer Muslims in
areas where there are many SCs and a similar percentage of Muslims in general and reserved
constituencies might therefore be concealing a bias where reserved constituencies have more
Muslims than comparable general constituencies. To see whether this is the case, I matched each
of the reserved constituencies in the sample to a general constituency within the same district
22
with the most similar percentage of SCs in the population. This means that for each reserved
constituency, I found the general constituency within the same district with the most similarly
sized SC population, and I then reduced the sample to only comparing these pairs of very similar
reserved and general constituencies.16 
Table 2: Output from matching models
Full data Matched
data
Matched with
caliper
Percentage of Muslims in general cons. 11.0 9.9 8.8
Percentage of Muslims in reserved 
cons.
9.7 9.7 8.6
Difference in means -1.3 -0.3 -0.2
P-value <0.01 0.39 0.65
Percentage of SCs in general cons. 13.8 21.1 20.7
Percentage of SCs in reserved cons. 24.8 24.7 20.8
Difference in means 11.0 3.6 0.1
P-value <0.01 <0.01 0.93
Number of general constituencies 2493 487 116
Number of SC constituencies 489 487 116
Table 2 presents the results from the matching analysis. The first column shows the
percentage of Muslims and SCs in the full data, the second column presents the data for the
matched cases. Here we see that there is still an average difference of 3.6 percentage points in the
percentage of SCs in the constituencies, since the constituency with the highest proportion of SCs
16An exact match on state and district and a closest neighbor match on percentage of SC in the
constituency, without replacement, was done using the package Matching in the R programming
environment. Since the reserved constituencies were selected on the basis of percentage of SCs
within each district, matching constituencies in this way should make the matched constituencies
very similar on other characteristics too. I checked the balance for these matched constituencies
on a range of other variables available in the primary census abstract, such as the literacy rate in
the constituency, the percent STs, the percent workers and so on and found that they were indeed
very comparable. None of these other variables came out as statistically significantly different in
a t-test or a KS-test. For a more extensive discussion of matching constituencies, see Jensenius
(2013).
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sometimes has a much higher percentage of SCs than the constituency with the second-highest
proportion of SCs. These pairs are still much more comparable than the whole sample, and here
we see that the percentage of Muslims is only about 0.25 percentage points lower in reserved
constituencies than in general constituencies, but this difference is not statistically significant (p-
value of 0.39 in a paired t-test).17
In the third column I present a matching model where the matches were restricted to being at
most 0.5 percentage points apart. This means that if the general constituency that was paired up
with a reserved constituency had an SC population that was more than 0.5 percentage points
smaller than the reserved constituency, then this pair was discarded from the analysis.18 In this
case we are left with 116 pairs of very similar constituencies, where the reserved constituencies
only have 0.07 percentage points more SCs than the general constituencies on average. In other
words, here we are comparing very similar pairs of constituencies within the same districts, of
which half were reserved and half were general. When we compare very similar constituencies in
this way, we can see that there was virtually no difference in the percentage of Muslims in
reserved and general constituencies. The difference of 0.1 percentage points is far from being
statistically significant (p-value of 0.93 in a paired t-test). There is no pattern in this data of
Muslims being over-represented in reserved constituencies. 
Conclusion
Muslims have been under-represented in Indian politics since independence. In the Sachar
Committee report from 2006, evidence was provided that a number of constituencies reserved for
Scheduled Castes (SCs) have a high proportion of Muslims and a low proportion of SCs. This
17A two-sample t-test is used when looking at the full data, but on the matched data I use a
paired t-test since we can assume the same variance in the two groups after they have been
matched up.
18Here I used a caliper on the variable for percentage of SC, so that matched pairs could be at
most 0.5 percentage points apart on that variable.
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information could be interpreted as an allegation that the Delimitation Commission willfully had
assigned reserved seats to areas with a high concentration of Muslims in order to weaken the
political influence of the Muslim community. 
This paper has shown that the evidence provided by the Sachar report was misleading and
that Muslims were not over-represented in the state assembly constituencies that were reserved
between 1974 and 2007. The detailed records of the work of the Delimitation Committee in the
1970s show that the process of delimiting constituencies was done systematically on the basis of
census data and maps. The Delimitation Commission was under strong political pressure to
change borders and change the location of reserved seats, but this was mostly related to
politicians wanting to avoid their constituency becoming reserved, and such suggestions were for
the most part rejected by the Delimitation Commission. There is no evidence in the records of the
selection of reserved seats being influenced by the demographic distribution of religious
communities. This can be confirmed by looking at the actual numbers of Muslims in reserved and
general constituencies. Using estimates of the Muslim population across the constituencies in 14
Indian states, based on block-level data from the 1971 census, I show that Muslims were a
majority in only 52 state assembly constituencies (of which only 2 were reserved) and that
Muslims were not over-represented in reserved constituencies. When we compare reserved
constituencies to comparable general constituencies there is no difference in the percentage of
Muslims in their populations. 
It is true that the Muslims population is sometimes larger than the SC population in reserved
constituencies, but that is the result of Muslims being more numerous than SCs in many
constituencies across India. The SC reservations have been designed in such a way that SCs are
usually a minority in reserved constituencies, and the majority of people living in reserved
constituencies will therefore be unable to run for election. Sometimes Muslims form a large part
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of those other people, and this does affect the Muslims from that constituency politically, since
the competition is blocked off for only SC candidates. This is one of the disadvantages of
reserved seats: some people are guaranteed representation at the cost of others. However, as I
have shown in this paper, the SC reservations have not affected the Muslim community any more
or less than other non-SC communities. In the case of Muslims it might seem more unfair to lose
the opportunity to compete from a constituency with a large co-religious community since
Muslims have been politically under-represented in India, but the current Indian electoral system
is not based on an assumption of ethnic voting.  Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to how to
design quotas that help some without seeming unfair to others.19 The only good solution to
improving the representation of all groups in India is to either change the electoral system to a
more proportional design or to reduce social divisions and biases enough for candidates from all
groups to become competitive without the help of institutional safeguards.
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